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Here, Hobbs discusses the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). Ratified in 2003, KPCS was designed to bring an end to the international trade in blood diamonds -- gemstones trafficked by African rebel groups to finance civil wars. Currently, 81 states are party to the agreement, including all major rough diamond producing countries. The KPCS emerged out of earlier efforts to de-fund the Angolan rebel movement UNITA, which from 1992 to 2002, waged a brutal civil war against the Angolan government. Under the KPCS agreement, member states must 'establish a system of internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of conflict diamonds from shipments of rough diamonds imported into and exported from its territory,' and 'amend or enact appropriate laws or regulations to implement and enforce the Certification Scheme and to maintain dissuasive and proportional penalties for transgressions.' KPCS enforcement relies on voluntary self-monitoring and self-policing. In theory, to obtain a Kimberley Process certificate, diamond producers are required to present evidence to a government monitoring body that their diamonds are conflict-free, while governments are expected to check that the evidence is genuine. Adapted from the source document.

In the late 1990s, the issue of diamonds contributing to conflict began to receive global attention. In response, the Kimberley Process, an international agreement drawn up in 2003, was implemented to reduce the trade of conflict diamonds and provide a way to certify the global diamond trade. This study looks at the political economy of resource-wealthy states in Africa to understand responses to the Kimberley Process, asking why some African states have higher levels of compliance and co-operation than others. Using cross-country comparisons to explain differing state policies and outcomes, Nathan Munier explores whether domestic, private economic actors matter in how international agreements operate. In doing so, he asks why states that regularly ignore international agreements will use scarce resources to raise their level of compliance with the Kimberley Process. Focusing on the domestic political economy of states, in contrast to past theories of state responses to international agreements, Munier finds that economic dependence and the preferences of private actors are essential in understanding the variation of state responses to international agreements.

In the late 1990s, the issue of diamonds contributing to conflict began to receive global attention. In response, the Kimberley Process, an international agreement drawn up in 2003, was implemented to reduce the trade of conflict diamonds and provide a way to certify the global diamond trade. This study looks at the political economy of resource-wealthy states in Africa to understand responses to the Kimberley Process, asking why some African states have higher levels of compliance and co-operation than others. Using cross-country comparisons to explain differing state policies and outcomes, Nathan Munier explores whether domestic, private economic actors matter in how international agreements operate. In doing so, he asks why states that regularly ignore international agreements will use scarce resources to raise their level of compliance with the Kimberley Process. Focusing on the domestic political economy of states, in contrast to past theories of state responses to international agreements, Munier finds that economic dependence and the preferences of private actors are essential in understanding the variation of state responses to international agreements.

There has been a great deal of academic discourse about policy and governance choices embedded in the UNFCCC-based regimes for Climate Change action, and they point to the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of such regimes, which is often attributed to the fact that they hinge on the political authority of State actors and lack meaningful enforcement mechanisms. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that an alternative regime may be needed; and that for an effective regulatory framework for Climate Change action to emerge there needs to be a regulatory imperativeness similar to that upon which the Kimberley Process was created, where Non-State Actors play a leadership role. It also argues that in addition to regulatory imperativeness, the making and enforcement of the Kimberley Process provides helpful lessons towards crafting a more effective Climate Change remedial regime. ; https://grassrootsjournals.org/jelp/0102m00236.html#status